2-1 Historical
The considerations are illustrated in two eases, both Of which are presented from tit« -aspect of decryption (the same rational* can be applied fieem the viewpoint of encryption as veil).
For all. eases the module is assumed to be placed along' a terminal rod/-black boundary In the host. For case one, on the blaek aide it is assumed that thee* is no "smarts support for message disassembly (i.e., which part of the massage should go through a decryption process and vhich should not). m this case (sea figure 3.3.2b) the entire message packet has to ba passea through the modal« to the host without processing. Once received by the host, the message can then be disassembled into' its encrypted and unencrypted parts. She encrypted pasts are then fed back through the module from the host.side for decryption and then assembled into a folly decrypted message.
An advantage to this approach is that the I/O used in suob a host can be talrly unsophisticated (i.e., UABT or parallel port). A distinct disadvantage with this process is additional time delay incurred through a second pass of data to the module. ' , In ease two (see figure 3.3.2c). the assumption is that the I/O is sophisticated enough so that additional functions of assembly and disassembly can be, imposed upon it (thereby offloading the host). She I/O buffers the black message and disassembles it into encrypted and unencrypted parts, it then transfers the uncencryptod part through the module to the host» the encrypted pact is also passed through, bat decrypted "on the fly." She end result on the host side is that only unencrypted messages are seen. Shis example is typical of the approach required for L&H's whore a complicated I/o is the nosm.
Bypass.
Encryption is a symmetric process to the decryption, with the exception that unencrypted portions (i.e.* header, trailer) aüst over the red/black boundary, Ji&taat * pWtfcBMaJL • seausity la' the Sepaen« nodule, bypass is aa internal function HmTrert and audited to prevent abuse.
In the Foresee and wuadstor, bypass ia an asternal function (not serviced by the modules).
it is the responsibility of the integrator to ebntrol all bypass functions so as not to cause major insecurities to a system using Foresee or Windstor, and to prevent alarm lookup situation in the Tspache.
CryprotT-aphic
Modas. Each module typ« supports several cryptographic nodes. These modes allow tor use of eryptology under a nuaber of different system situations and provide backward compatibility to a number of existing crypto equipments.
It is primarily a host responsibility to enforce proper use of module cryptographic modes. th* system designer must identify that subset of modes applicable to th* system and then pass this information en to the hose integrators for proper mode use at host level.
She exact place,where crypto sync is oetaeted varies among eh* module types, zn modules like Foresee and Windstor, the loss of syne is detected within the module, in the repacbe thtt loss of sync must be detected by the host. la all cases once a loss of sync has occurred, it is a host action to correct.
StftOQUg
Project OVmxAXE offers significant benefits to the host systems integrator. She mltifuoction, dynamically reconfigurable nature of the modules permits the incorporation of endorsed cryptography in a wide range of functional environments. The unclassified nature of the module permits the use of endorsed cryptography in previously forbidden physical environments, aa well as reducing the integrator's costs and schedule.
Module cost is further nduced and availability enhanced by the broad supplier base.' Interoperability permits interconnection with» and the orderly upgrade ot, systems which use current cryptographic products.
Abovu all, the enforcement of standard interfaces to the modules will facilitate long-term technical"planning, reduce technical risk« and permit systems to easily $M0gfo*|fa m«tota-lsipel iamrovement« in technology. 
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